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Is there a brazilian solution for every african 
problem? Brazilian Health Cooperation in Angola 
(2006-2015)
Existe uma solução brasileira para cada problema 







The international system in general, and the international cooperation for development 
specifically, have been through important changes in the last decades. The emergence of 
South-South Cooperation (SSC) has become a trending topic among academics, practitioners 
and policy-makers. The assumption that the common problems and shared experiences of 
countries in the global South would make SSC more legitimate and perhaps more effective 
is frequently mentioned, as a former Brazilian minister of foreign affairs once said, “for 
every African problem there is a Brazilian solution”. This paper challenges this assertion 
synthesizing key findings, contextual information and analysis required for understanding 
Brazil’s engagement in Angola, within the sector of public health, from 2006 to 2015.
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Resumo
O sistema internacional em geral, e especificamente o sistema da cooperação internacional 
para o desenvolvimento, passaram por importantes mudanças nas últimas décadas. 
A emergência da Cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS) tem tido atenção crescente entre acadêmicos, 
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profissionais e policy-makers. Frequentemente o pressuposto de que problemas comuns 
e experiências compartilhadas entre países do sul global define a CSS como mais legítima e 
possivelmente mais efetiva, como disse um ex-Ministro de Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 
“para cada problema africano existe uma solução brasileira”. Esse artigo desafia essa 
afirmativa sintetizando conclusões importantes, informação e análise contextual necessárias 
para compreender o engajamento brasileiro em Angola, no setor da saúde, entre os anos 
de 2006 e 2015. 
Palavras-chave: Cooperação Sul-Sul; Brasil; Angola; Saúde Pública.
 
Introduction
South-South Cooperation (SSC) has become a trending topic among academics, 
practitioners and policy-makers (BESHARATI; ESTEVES, 2015). Three sets of 
assumptions underpin the analysis of South-South Cooperation in general, and 
of Brazilian cooperation in particular, namely that: (i) the shared experiences of 
countries in the global South reveal important differences in regards to practices 
of South-South providers vis-à-vis Northern donors; (ii) the uniqueness of SSC 
rests on the principles it stands for, which are allegedly sharply different from the 
ones shared by traditional donors; and (iii) the volume of resources channelled 
through South-South cooperation, although currently modest, is about to see 
significant increase.
This paper discusses the first assumption, which relates to the frequently 
purported maxim that the common problems and shared experiences of countries 
in the global South would make SSC more legitimate and perhaps more effective4. 
As a former Brazilian minister of foreign affairs once said, “for every African 
problem there is a Brazilian solution” (AMORIM, 2016). This paper challenges 
this assertion through the presentation of findings from the Brazil SSC project5. 
4 For a comprehensive discussion on this assumption, see Cesarino (2013)
5 The project, conducted by the BRICS Policy Center from September 2013 to February 2015, aimed to analyse 
Brazilian development cooperation practices in Africa within the broader context of the BRICS’ growing presence 
on the continent. The project investigated the impacts of Brazil’s role in the fields of agriculture and public 
health, on both Brazilian cooperation agents and on a variety of local stakeholders. Geographically, the project 
focuses on two countries where Brazil has been rapidly expanding its engagement and cooperation programmes: 
Angola and Mozambique. The framework approach was used as the methodological strategy. A field research 
and the organization of a validation workshop conducted in Angola allowed the team to interview more than 
20 people in Luanda, including representatives from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, academia, civil 
society, and the national government, in addition to representatives of the Brazilian government. Due to the 
sensitive content of the interviews, it was agreed that no interviewee or institution would be directly identified. 
Also, the team had many opportunities to conduct additional interviews in Brazil. 
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The objective of this article is to synthesize key findings, contextual information 
and analysis required for understanding Brazil’s engagement in Angola, as well 
as basic information on Brazilian projects under execution during the time the 
fieldwork was carried within the sector of public health. Very little on Brazilian 
development cooperation in Angola seems to have been produced by other 
research projects, which highlights the importance of this article. Information 
gathered, including additional interviews with implementing and coordinating 
institutions in Brazil, will also feed into deeper analysis in future publications. 
The article sets out by presenting a contextual analysis, going briefly through 
Angola’s recent historical trajectory, and state-society relations in the country in 
light of traditional development cooperation. Brazilian relations with Angola are 
subsequently discussed, which provides a background for subsections on health 
cooperation and a case study on the PROFORSA project. Based on the analysis 
of health cooperation between Brazil and Angola, this article tries to show that 
the supposed similarities among developing countries were rarely found in the 
field. The South-South Cooperation characteristics are largely dependent on the 
beneficiary country’s context, as the Angolan case has shown. Indeed, in Angola, 
where the political elite holds control of the country’s development agenda, the 
fieldwork indicated important resistances against some of the Brazilian technical 
cooperation projects.
Context
Independence and Civil War6
As soon as the Portuguese left Angola in November 1975, disagreements 
between different national liberation movements who had been fighting for 
independence led to a protracted civil war. MPLA (Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola) managed to become the dominant political faction, promoting 
economic reforms based on its Marxist-Leninist ideals. José Eduardo dos Santos 
was appointed President in 1979, after the death of Agostinho Neto. Subsequent 
attempts to achieve lasting peace between MPLA and UNITA (National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola) were unsuccessful.
6 Main sources used to develop the historical segments include Durost Fish (2002) and UNESCO et al. (2010).
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Vast volumes of development cooperation resources provided by United 
Nations agencies, bilateral donors, international NGOs and religious organisations 
were directed towards Angola during the civil war. Those were primarily aimed 
at emergency and humanitarian objectives, often reaching beyond government-
controlled areas. The availability of funds gave rise to the establishment of a 
number of international and national civil society organisations in the country. 
In addition to providing funding, international agencies played a significant role 
in facilitating the safe mobility of development workers through war zones7.
Angola’s civil war ended with the killing of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader, 
by government troops in 2002. The war resulted in at least 500 thousand Angolan 
deaths. More than one third of the country’s population were forcibly displaced 
(POLGREEN, 2003). While the death of its leader left UNITA in disarray (CAUVIN, 
2002), opposition would frequently arise from inside the government, and the 
threat of a new civil war was always a concern for the Santos regime. Such political 
considerations played an important role in guiding the government’s domestic 
and international engagement. According to the World Bank (2005), the post-
war budget “reflect[ed] political choices still concerned with the prevalence of a 
wartime budget”.
Mistrust and plotting8 were deeply rooted features in Angola’s political system, 
and the Santos government attempted to stifle internal disputes and secure its 
position by expanding the role of the state rather than reducing it (POWER, 
2012). When Angola turned to traditional donors for reconstruction funds after 
the civil war, it faced various conditionalities. These included, for example, the 
establishment of a monitoring mechanism to assess government performance 
for a period of three semesters before the country became eligible for renewed 
financial support. The government was not willing to relinquish its autonomy on 
policy formulation and implementation in exchange for assistance. As a result, 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) did not provide the large quantities of 
funds required for reconstruction and development. The reluctance of donors to 
participate in Angola’s donor conference, a priority initiative for the government 
after the end of the civil war, continues to be a source of resentment for the 
government of Angola (GoA). Its is relevant to notice that the oil production 
was a key factor increasing GoA’s bargaining power toward traditional donors, 
7 Anonymous interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.
8 As exemplified by the wide restructuring of the security apparatus after Miala, Santos’s head of foreign intelligence, 
was sacked in 2006 for engaging in “activities against the president” (JORNAL DE ANGOLA 2007 apud 2008).
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enabling the government to refuse conditionalities traditional donors tried to 
impose (FERREIRA, 2005).
Despite impressive economic growth during the last decade, 30.6% of Angolans 
live below the national poverty line9. Wealth is unequally distributed among its 
20.8 million citizens (2012), with economic growth benefits are mostly restricted 
to the top 5% of the population and 0.18% of the country’s territory (CENTRO 
DE ESTUDOS DE INVESTIGAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA, 2011). Angola’s gini coefficient 
is 0.586, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (WORLD BANK, 2016a). 
Notwithstanding the harsh circumstances inextricably linked to more than 25 years 
of civil war, Angola is today a functioning state that is not dependent on foreign 
aid. Paradoxically, the same war that destroyed the region’s infrastructure, killed 
at least half a million people, and displaced another four million, also enabled the 
development of a sense of national identity and allegiance to the state, facilitating 
large-scale indigenous capital accumulation (MALAQUIAS, 2007).
Dependence on Aid and Oil
As previously discussed, after the end of the war the convening of a 
donors’ conference, aimed at raising funds and establishing commitments for 
the reconstruction of Angola’s infrastructure and economy, stood as one of the 
government’s priority initiatives. The failure of the IMF and the GoA to reach 
an agreement, prompted by different views on governance and transparency, 
as well as donor concerns over incompatible sets of statistics, were significant 
obstacles to the conference10. With no substantial concessions from either side, 
the conference was repeatedly delayed over the years, never actually taking place. 
Additionally, the GoA never got the “seal of approval that could then make them 
eligible for debt rescheduling through the Paris Club” (BRAUTIGAM, 2009, 274). 
According to more than one informant, many of the GoA’s senior officials exhibit 
to this day great resentment against Northern donors for “not helping Angola in 
times of need”11.
Some regard this dispute as triggering closer China-Angola relations, since it 
was at that time that Southern countries, particularly China, began to consolidate 
9 National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. Source: 
World Bank, 2016b.
10 See Misanet, Angola Peace Monitor, Afrol News (2003).
11 Anonymous interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014. 
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their foothold in Angola. One informant reported that, when discussing China-
Angola relations, more than once he had heard from senior officials at the GoA that 
“when you are drowning, it doesn’t matter who is throwing you the life jacket”. 
Angola’s increased oil production and the discovery of new oil fields, the then 
rising oil prices in the international market, and China’s “go out” policy lined up 
to boost bilateral relations.
Endeavouring to rebuild the country’s war-torn infrastructure, Angola has 
since invested heavily in its partnership with China12. In exchange for guaranteed 
oil supplies, Angola has gained access to multi-billion dollar Chinese credit lines. 
Meanwhile, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China 
both in 2006 and 2010, and has become China’s main trade partner in Africa, with 
bilateral trade reaching US$ 24.6 billion in 2010 (POWER, 2012). The deepening of 
these relations between credit-hungry Angola and oil-starved China has enabled 
Angola’s government to carry out its development policies without promoting the 
broad institutional reforms imposed by donors and IFIs in other African countries, 
such as Mozambique and Uganda (GIROD, 2008).
State-society relations and traditional development cooperation in Angola
Vast fluxes of development cooperation provided by United Nations agencies, 
bilateral donors, international NGOs and religious organizations shifted towards 
Angola during the civil war. Those were primarily geared towards emergency 
and humanitarian objectives, and often got to places virtually unreachable by 
government actors. The availability of funds enabled a mix of international 
and national civil society organizations to emerge and grow in Angola. Besides 
providing funding, international agencies played a significant role in facilitating 
safe mobility of development workers within war zones13.
12 The oil-backed loan that China provided to Angola in 2004 is often depicted as an alternative that enabled the 
African country to dismiss reforms supported by the IMF, which, allegedly, would have led to greater governance 
in Angola, if implemented. With some nuances, this also represented the view of most interviewees. Brautigam 
convincingly argues, however, that the Chinese government did not do anything that Western banks such as 
BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Societé Générale, Barclays or Standard Chartered were not doing before or after 
the Chinese deal. The difference was that Chinese conditions were significantly more favorable to Angola, 
including smaller interest rates and larger grace and repayment periods. Moreover, Angolans later managed 
to pay their debts with revenue from the booming oil industry, increasing their transparency in the meantime 
(BRAUTIGAM, 2009, 273-277).
13 Anonymous interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.
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After the end of the war, many civil society organizations disappeared with 
the retraction of traditional development cooperation in Angola following the end 
of the civil war. Not only were they fund-starved, but they also had to cope with 
rising costs and more strict government regulations. This trend was particularly 
evident in Luanda, where significant numbers of people had moved in search of 
security during the conflict years14. Due to especially high costs in Luanda, some 
NGOs also relocated their headquarters to Benguela. More manageable direct 
expenses came at significant operational costs and difficulties, since Luanda 
remained the country’s administrative centre. 
Additionally, Angolan interviewees often pointed out the regulatory framework 
pertaining to associations, including the law of associations – “Law n. 14/91 of 
May 11th” (GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA, 1991) – as another driver of the reduction 
in the number of civil society organizations during the post-War years. Related 
obstacles mentioned by some informants included the difficulties in receiving 
foreign funds, as well as the substantial limitations to institutional autonomy 
imposed on organizations registered as “associations of general interest”. As a 
result, most interviewees characterized Angolan civil society as small, with capacity 
concentrated in a handful of organizations, and non-independent, with many of 
the more vocal organizations being linked to MPLA, the ruling party. However, 
the same interviewees pointed out significant progress in the past 3-5 years, due 
to parallel positive developments in democratic governance and transparency.
The GoA is increasingly active within the region, and plays important roles in 
regional bodies such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The document Angola 2025 establishes the country’s long-term vision, 
being carried out in the medium-term through the National Development Plan 
2013-2017, the first national development plan elaborated under the new Angolan 
Constitution, in 2010 (MPDT, 2012). The Plan defines the following six broad 
national objectives: 1) preserving national unity and cohesion; 2) securing 
the basic principles necessary for development15; 3) improving quality of life; 
4) engaging youth in active life; 5) strengthening private sector development; and 
6) promoting the competitive insertion of Angola in the international context.
14 Anonymous interview carried out in Luanda in September 2014.
15 Defined as the preservation of macroeconomic stability, promotion of national population policy, promotion of an 
active employment and national human resource valorization policy, increasing productivity and transforming, 
diversifying and modernizing the country’s economic structure.
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Box 1 – Angola’s National Development Plan 2013-2017:  
objectives and priorities for the health sector
Objective Priorities
To sustainably promote  
Angolan population’s sanitary 
state, guarantee the population’s 
longevity, supporting less 
favoured social groups and 
contributing to the fight against 
poverty
1. To increase life expectancy at birth
2.  To improve the Human Development Index and the Millennium 
Development Goals
3.  To reduce maternal, child and youth mortality, as well as 
morbidity and mortality under the national nosology framework
4.  To improve the organization, management and functioning of 
the National Health System, through directing necessary funds 
and adopting norms and procedures aimed at improving the 
efficiency and quality of NHS’ response
5.  To improve health care services in the areas of promotion, 
prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, reinforcing the 
articulation between primary care and hospital care.
6.  To participate in the transformation of social determinants of 
health and promote national and international partnerships 
aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality and 
strengthening the programmes of fight against major endemics
7.  To improve health care services in the areas of promotion, 
prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, reinforcing the 
articulation between primary care and hospital care
8.  To adequate human resources to objectives and goals, and adopt 
new health technologies
9.  To develop the capacity of individuals, families and communities 
for the promotion and protection of health
10.  To monitor and assess the performance of the sector through 
SIS and special studies
Source: Angola’s National Development Plan 2013-2017 (MPDT, 2012).
The National Development Plan 2013-2017 reveals a robust, modernizing 
conception of development, with significant emphasis placed on economic growth. 
However, despite the substantial growth rates of Angola in the last few years, social 
indicators remain generally low. Life expectancy at birth in Angola (51 years) is 
below the average for sub-Saharan Africa, and 36.6% of the population still lives 
below the national poverty line16.
This context points to both the potential and challenges for development 
cooperation. While it is safe to assume that development cooperation funds will 
continue to play a marginal role in the country’s Gross National Income – the 
16 Source: World Bank Data (2016c). 
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current total of US$ 200 million of net ODA (2011) encompasses less than 0.3% 
of the country’s GNI – it could also play an important role in improving social 
indicators as well as reducing poverty and inequality.
Among OECD’s Development Assistance Committee donors, the United States 
is by far the largest in terms of gross Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
– totalling approximately US$ 63 million between 2010-2011. European Union 
institutions (US$ 26 million), Japan (US$ 25 million), South Korea17 (US$ 18 
million) and Portugal (US$ 18 million) are also significant donors. Donor’s ODA 
is primarily directed to Angola’s social sectors, particularly education, health and 
population18.
As with civil society organizations and donors, budgets of United Nations 
agencies in Angola were significantly reduced over the past decade, which 
contributed to a redefinition of scope of action in light of the GoA’s demands and 
needs. As shown in Table 2, UN agencies’ efforts are concentrated in the GoA’s 
institutional and human capital development, particularly through the provision 
of targeted technical assistance.
Initiatives of UN agencies are based on the UN Development Assistance 
Framework in Angola (UNDAF-Angola). UNDAF-Angola aims to harmonize and 
integrate the UN system at a country level. The new UNDAF has not yet come to 
fruition. UNDAF 2009-2013 prioritizes 4 support areas, highlighted by outcome 
in Table 2. The World Bank Group (WBG) has similarly redefined its strategic 
engagement in Angola. Following a decade of ill-established relations with the GoA, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International 
Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have released in August 2013 
a joint country partnership strategy for 2014-101619.
17 It is noteworthy that, although a DAC member, South Korea considers itself a South-South provider. 
18 According to the OECD, population sector activities typically include population/development policies, census 
work, vital registration, migration data, demographic research/analysis, reproductive health research, as well 
as other unspecified population activities (OECD, 2015)
19 The World Bank’s institutional engagement in Angola was renewed with an Interim Strategy Note that accounted 
for the period of 2003-2005, focused on macroeconomic stability programmes and disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration efforts. Many interviewees mentioned that the GoA nurtured some frustration with the Word 
Bank during the first half of the 2000s, mainly due to the perception that the international institution had 
not pushed strongly enough for the organization of a donor’s conference, as it was expected by the national 
government. Subsequent attempts, supported by the World Bank, to constitute a formal development partners’ 
coordination structure in Angola were allegedly watered down by the Ministry of Planning. Two other Interim 
Strategy Notes were developed for 2005-2007 and 2007-2009. With significant socioeconomic improvements 
enabled by the development of the extractive industries in Angola, the World Bank decided to formalize a 
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Box 2 – UNDAF 2009-2013: Support areas and outcomes
Support area 1:  
Governance, Justice and Data 
for Development
UNDAF outcome 1:
National Institutions responded to the needs of the whole population, 
including the poor and most vulnerable and at the same time national 
and local public institutions were strengthened, as well as community 
engagement, civic participation towards social cohesion, national 
reconciliation and the empowerment of women 
Support area 2:  
Social Sectors
UNDAF outcome 2:
Increased and more equitable access to integrated social services at 
national and sub-national levels with emphasis on MDGs
Support area 3:  
HIV & AIDS
UNDAF outcome 3:
Strengthened national institutional and technical response to HIV and 
AIDS to accelerate progress towards universal access to prevention, 
treatment, care and support as a step on the road to the achievement to 
the MDGs by 2015, and to eradicate stigma and discrimination, and to 
meet the epidemic’s multigenerational challenge 




National and decentralized institutions strengthened integrated rural 
development guaranteeing food security based on environmental 
protection of natural resources and the management and adaptation to 
climate change
Source: UNDAF Angola 2009-2013 (UNDAF, 2009)
As it has appeared in the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy 
2014-2016, the general perception among interviewees was that the GoA has been 
maintaining a “strong record of own-management of its development agenda” 
(WORLD BANK, 2005, p.18). As such, both bilateral and multilateral development 
partners, with few niche-related exceptions, have to play by the GoA’s rules if 
they wish to participate in development policy formulation and implementation. 
This is in many ways a result of GoA’s not so “new-found sense of political and 
economic leverage” (CORKIN, 2008), which has been intrinsically linked with 
the development of the oil and extractive industries in the country. Moreover, the 
oil and extractive industries have attracted both traditional and emerging powers 
willing to take part in the expansion of these economic sectors. Even though the 
GoA is still highly dependent on natural resources and international commodities 
prices, when compared to other settings, such as Mozambique, oil and natural 
clearer country strategy for the following years. An informant pointed out that the World Bank, after conducting 
an assessment of the credit situation in Angola, also ended up agreeing with the idea of having one country 
partnership strategy for the World Bank Group, which came into effect in August 2013, accounting for the 
period 2014-2016. 
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resources dependency has distinctive effects on how the actors posit themselves 
within the development field. Hence, while aid dependency in Mozambique 
has been contributing to limiting national ownership, oil dependency in Angola 
has enabled the Government to take over its development agenda, despite the 
negative short and medium-term effects on wealth concentration and democratic 
consolidation. Furthermore, as discussed below, the growing emerging powers’ 
foothold in Angola has enhanced the GoA’s capacity to carry out development 
policies and programs.20
Brazil-Angola development relations
Relations between the regions that would, eventually, become Brazil and Angola 
date back to the XVII century. Brazil was the first Western nation to recognize 
Angola as a sovereign country, in 1975, a fact that is regularly remembered by 
Angolan senior officials in mid and high-level meetings. The Brazilian embassy 
to Angola was formally created in the same year.
Brazil’s national development bank (BNDES) funds several projects carried out 
by Brazilian companies in Angola, particularly in the infrastructure sector. Banks 
such as Caixa Econômica Federal, Banco do Brasil and Bradesco are also present 
in the country. Like China, the Brazilian government also uses commodities and 
raw material as credit guarantees (GARCIA; KATO; FONTES, 2013).
Angola is the main target of Brazilian investments in Africa. Currently, 
Brazil ranks 4th in Angola’s top import countries and 19th as Angola’s top export 
destinations (WALDERSEE, 2015). For Brazil, trade with Angola represents 0.4% of 
its total foreign trade. According to APEX, Brazil has been benefiting significantly 
from Angola’s growth. Bilateral trade between Brazil and Angola grew significantly 
between 2000 and 2010, reaching an all-time high in 2008 of US$ 4.21 billion. 
Brazil’s leading export sectors to Angola in 2010 were production and packing 
of meat and fish (23.7%) and the manufacturing and refining of sugar (13.0%). 
Main Brazilian imports from Angola in the same year were oil and natural gas 
20 This contextual analysis does not imply, however, that Angola is achieving better development outcomes than 
aid dependent countries like Mozambique. Rather, the oil and natural resources dependency very often stresses 
the negative impacts of focusing on static comparative advantages and the consequent economic concentration 
around specific sectors.
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(73.7%) and oil-derived products (25.9%)21. From 2009-2013, Brazilian exports to 
Angola were reduced by 4.6% and imports increased by 427.6%, which indicates 
a transformation of the trade balance in favour of Angola.22
Angola is also a relevant destination for Brazilian private companies’ 
investment. In fact, Angola concentrates the highest number of Brazilian small 
and medium enterprises in Africa. Furthermore, BNDES has disbursed US$ 2.8 
billion for private investments in Africa since 2007, of which Angola has received 
96% (WALDERSEE, 2015). Table 3 presents some of the main projects carried out 
by Brazilian transnational companies in Angola and figure 1 locates the projects 
in Angola’s map.
Figure 1: Brazilian infrastructure projects in Angola
Source: Waldersee, 2015
21 Apex Brasil Website, 2014
22 MDIC, 2014 
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Exploration of oi and biofuels. Partner in 6 oi blocks and operator 
in 4. Since June 2013, Petrobras acts in a joint venture with BTG 
Pactual Bank (50% each) worth US$1.5 million for oil and gas 
exploration in several African countries, including Angola. 
Vale 2005 Mining
Joint venture with Genius for mineral excavation (primarily 






Works in partnership with Zagope Construções e Engenharia, 
a Portuguese subsidiary, to gain access to EU finances. It has 
constructed various roads and the express highway between 
Luanda and Viana to the International Airport of Luanda. 
Renovation of the International Airport of Lubango. Extended 







Construction of Uige-Maquela road. Partners with Escom, a 
Portuguese firm, and Gema, an Angolan firm, in constructing 
a cement factory in Benguela. 
Odebrecht 1984
Construction / 
Infrastructure /  
Agriculture / 
Energy / Retail/ 
Real State
Holds 25 contracts in the country in real estate, biofuels, minerals, 
agribusiness, and energy. Highlighted examples: Construction of 
Capanda Hydroelectric Dam in Malange. Hydroelectric project 
in Cambambe. Owns 40% of Biocom, Angolan bioenergy firm 
(ethanol), and 20% of Sonangol. SENAI does training programs 
for Biocom, for example. Runs Nosso Super supermarket chain 
in joint venture with Angolan government, with 37 shops in 
the country. An agribusiness project that may be highlighted is 
the Farm Pungo a Ndongo (or Pungo Andongo). Odebrecht is 
responsible for the management of agroindustrial production, 
construction of factories and capacity building. Embrapa-Africa 
participated in experiments with varieties of corn, black beans, 
rice and soy.
Engevix 2005 Energy
Works in partnership with Angolan group Genius. Environmental 
engineering, electricity generation and distribution, involved in 




Construction of runways at Catoca airport, Luanda Sul. 
Asperbras 2007
Real State / 
Infrastructure
Involved in Special Economic Zones in Viana, Catete, Huambo, 
Negage, M'Banza Congo. Construction of real estate and 





Real State / 
Infrastructure
Real estate, roadwork construction and renovation.
Stefanini 2004 ICTs Technology and information industries.
Source: Vieitas and Aboim (2012); Institutional websites
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Brazil’s development cooperation with Angola dates back to the civil war 
period, focused then on professional development and vocational training. 
Inaugurated in 1998 with support from Brazil’s SENAI (Serviço Nacional de 
Aprendizagem Industrial- National Service for Industrial Training), the CFPC 
(Centro de Formação Profissional do Cazenga – Cazenga Center for Professional 
Training), located on the outskirts of Luanda, trains around 2,500 professionals 
yearly. Today cooperation sectors range from sports to fire fighting23. Embrapa 
and Fiocruz also respectively implement agricultural and health projects in 
the country. 
In 2012, Angola occupied the 10th position in terms of volume of technical 
cooperation received from Brazil, and it received the second least when compared 
to other developing countries in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries 
(CPLP) (ABC; IPEA 2016). According to Brazilian informants, Brazil’s bilateral 
cooperation with Angola would be characterized by low performance, allegedly 
related with factors such as difficulties in dialogue with Angolan counterparts, 
low decision-making power of executing agencies, and high rates of turnover 
among local coordinators.
Brazilian development cooperation in the health sector
Brazilian-Angolan development cooperation in the health sector begun in 
1996 when the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) organized a mission with 
health experts to discuss prospective projects in strategic areas already defined 
within the CPLP. Since then, governments from Portuguese speaking countries in 
Africa, Angola included, have demanded support for their own national health 
systems. Table 4 presents the projects listed at ABC website.
23 Information available at Brazilian Embassy in Luanda (MRE, 2016).
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During the 1990’s the emphasis was on training and capacity building. After 
ten years, CPLP health ministries were able to set up a strategic plan (2009-2012) 
for the health sector. The strategic plan had as its main objective strengthening 
national health systems in order to assure universal access to quality health 
services24. The plan encompassed seven strategic axes and four structuring 
networks. Besides the structuring networks established within CPLP’s health plan, 
Brazilian Health Ministry and FIOCRUZ expanded to African countries the Human 
Milk Bank Network. When compared with Mozambique, the Angolan case shows 
its problematic engagement in CPLP’s strategic axis and structuring networks. 
Table 5 presents CPLP’s strategic axes, and a comparison between Angola and 
Mozambique, both in terms of projects developed with Brazilian agencies in these 
two countries, and their participation within the structuring networks. 
Box 5: CPLP’s Strategic Axes and structuring networks and Brazilian SSC  
projects in Angola and Mozambique
CPLP's strategic axes (SA) and structuring 
networks (SN)
Brazilian SSC projects 




Angola Mozambique Angola Mozambique
SA1 –  Training and development of health 
workforce
X X
SA2 – information and communication in health X
SA3 – research in health X
SA4 –  development of the health-industrial 
complex
X
SA5 –  epidemiological surveillance and 
monitoring of health situation
X
SA6 – emergences and natural disasters
SA7 – promotion and protection of health X X
SN1 – national health institutes X
SN2 – national schools of public health X X
SN3 – health technical schools X X
SN4 –  technical centres of installation and 
maintenance of equipment
X
Source: The authors, based on Buss, Ferreira and Hoirisch (2011)
24 For more information, see: CPLP’s Strategic Plan for Health Cooperation (CPLP, 2009).
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According to a document provided by the Embassy of Brazil in Luanda 
during one of the interviews, referring to July 2013, there were only two bilateral 
cooperation projects being executed in Angola in the area of health – Pilot Project 
in Sickle Cell Disease and the Phase 2 of Capacity Development for Angola’s 
Health System Project. These projects were also the only ones listed as being 
under execution on the ABC website.
Despite the “under execution” status attributed to the projects, correspondence 
exchanged with Brazil’s Ministry of Health in September 2014 on the sickle cell 
disease project noted that there was several inconsistencies in project execution, 
insinuating that the project had been finalized without partners having completed 
previously agreed activities. The second mentioned project also seems to have 
been finalized, though no involved Angolan party in Luanda was available for 
comment. 
Additionally, it is not unlikely that, as in many other countries, technical 
cooperation projects under negotiation in Angola were stopped due to the severe 
budget cuts in both Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ABC. The following 
subsection discusses specifically PROFORSA, Brazil’s most well-known health 
project in Angola, highlighting some of its successes and challenges.
PROFORSA
PROFORSA was a 3-year triangular cooperation initiative involving Brazil, 
Japan and Angola aimed at strengthening individual, institutional and systemic 
capacity in the Angolan health sector. It was found to be the most well known 
among Brazil’s health cooperation projects in Angola, although specific knowledge 
about the project varied significantly across health sector stakeholders. 
The origins of PROFORSA are related to the intersection between UNICAMP’s 
cooperation – ongoing since 2004 in the area of capacity development for Angolan 
tertiary health workers – and JICA’s efforts to develop capacity at Josina Machel 
Hospital in Luanda. JICA’s project involved both the infrastructural rehabilitation 
of the Hospital, and targeted health trainings activities for employees. Japan’s 
bilateral agency engaged Brazilian teams to carry out trainings, including through 
its Third Country Training Program (JICA-TCTP), due to the large benefits related to 
improved communication in the Portuguese language. Additionally, the coordinator 
of UNICAMP’s referred cooperation programme was a Brazilian infectious disease 
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specialist of Japanese descent, a factor that appeared in interviews as an enabler 
of further approximation between JICA and Brazilian counterparts. 
Both formal and informal assessments of such initiatives highlighted access 
to and quality of primary health care as key issues to be addressed in improving 
Angola’s health system and indicators. These issues manifested themselves in 
the vast number of unnecessary referrals of patients to central hospitals, which, 
consequently, overloaded central parts of Angola’s health system. This overarching 
diagnosis served as basis for the design of PROFORSA.
Table 1: PROFORSA’s initial budget





With the formulation of PROFORSA as a triangular cooperation project in 
2011, Fiocruz, through Joaquim Venâncio Polytechnic School of Health (EPSJV/
Fiocruz) and Sergio Arouca National School of Public Health (ENSP/Fiocruz), 
became the lead institution in the project’s primary health component. The project 
targeted capacity development at four health reference centres25 in Luanda, chosen 
due to their strategic location and high number of referrals to central hospitals. 
The tertiary component, led by UNICAMP, particularly through Hospital Sumaré 
in Brazil, and JICA, focused on improving the organization of hospital services 
and nursing care, in areas such as neonatal and women’s health, at both Josina 
Machel Hospital and Lucrécia Paim Maternity.
Given that PROFORSA identified primary care and health management as the 
main issues to be addressed, a capacity development programme divided in 10 
modules, as well as a course for specialization in management of primary health 
units, was developed and implemented during the 3 years of the project. During 
the SSC project team’s visit to Luanda, PROFORSA’s Angolan counterparts were 
implementing recommendations that responded to participatory assessments 
conducted during PROFORSA’s execution. Interviews pointed out that these 
25 The health centers in Samba, Ingobota, Rangel and Ilha. According to anonymous interviews, JICA had also 
previously donated equipment to those same health centers.
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recommendations have been generally well accepted, pertaining to basic structural 
issues such as the integration of registry and record systems of clinical processes. 
In fact, the need for integration was reemphasized by a decree issued by Angola’s 
Ministry of Health in 2010. However, informants pointed out that the decree hadn’t 
been implemented systematically, due in part to lack of capacity and understanding 
by health workers who were supposed to implement those changes about the 
fundamental issues at hand.
In that sense, PROFORSA was a jointly developed structuring project. The 
project strived to provide capacity and knowledge needed for the implementation 
of basic public policies across the entire health sector, including through trainings 
on management and organization of health and clinical process records. Its design 
was guided by a consensual diagnosis of systemic yet context-specific issues 
within Angola’s health system, which had already been identified and, sometimes, 
targeted by public policies shown to be largely ineffective.
According to interviewees, the models of management and processes 
implemented were guided by decrees issued by Angola’s Ministry of Health, 
which were regularly discussed with regulatory authorities such as the National 
Directorate of Public Health and the Provincial Directorate of Health of Luanda. 
“On the job” training with key managers was also conducted in Brazil. The 
informants frequently stressed that all information used as evidence for diagnosis 
and implementation of solutions was locally collected. Altogether, such practices 
would guarantee the project’s national ownership and context sensitivity. 
One of the informants emphasized how Fiocruz had been very apt in promoting 
understanding of basic issues related to Angola’s health system among sectorial 
stakeholders. The same informant criticized other top-down initiatives, including 
the ones implemented through private health consultancy firms, some of which also 
from Brazil, which would impose new management rules, directives and practices 
without discussion with local health workers. The same was said to be true in 
relation to PROFORSA’s tertiary health component. While a management system 
had recently been implanted in Josina Machel Hospital by a health consultancy, 
UNICAMP and JICA found it necessary to develop a simpler management system, 
discussing it with health workers at the Hospital. During project execution, some 
emerging demands were met with specific activities proposed and led by JICA, 
one of which included the “Maternal-Infant Health Notebook”. This might have 
led to significant divergences between the Brazilian and Angolan counterparts, 
as highlighted below in the discussion of the project’s challenges.
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Besides issues related to management, participatory recommendations 
also highlighted poor signage at health care facilities. A task force of Angolan 
participants in the PROFORSA project was set up to propose changes to external 
and internal signage, which were brought to the Provincial Directorate of Health 
of Luanda for approval. During the visit of the SSC researcher to Luanda, signage 
changes had already been approved and were being implemented in the city.
While interviews pointed to the potentially significant and sustainable impact 
of gains from PROFORSA, many of the respondents also had a sizable stake in its 
success. Nonetheless, interviews exposed substantial challenges in the execution 
of PROFORSA. While interconnected, for analytical purposes, challenges may be 
understood in terms of three categories, related to: 1) implementation, 2) financing, 
and 3) political/cultural context.
Implementation challenges highlighted in interviews were mainly related 
to delays in the institutionalization of recommendations, attributed both to 
infrastructural issues that had to be overcome (e.g. creating an area for the storage 
and management of records in primary health units) and the lack of human 
resources required to carry out the transformations envisaged. There were reports 
of complaints, which where allegedly solved over the course of the project, related 
to inadequacies of the course venues at the beginning of the project, such as lack 
of ventilation and electricity, which hindered learning. Finally, there appeared to 
be significant inconsistencies in activities that should have been implemented by 
Brazil’s Ministry of Health, including the monitoring and evaluation of PROFORSA. 
Further research would be required to understand the specific causes of such 
inconsistencies. 
Financial problems were related to the Brazilian counterparts, more specifically 
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. With budget cuts in Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which significantly affected ABC’s work and projects, there had to be a 
restructuring of responsibility for PROFORSA’s third year project expenses. Most cuts 
were absorbed by JICA, while a smaller yet significant amount was allegedly absorbed 
by Angola’s Ministry of Health. Interviewees reported significant discontent from 
JICA in regards to this financial rearrangement. While it did not affect the project 
in the end, one can extrapolate that many similar projects may not have succeeded 
without a triangular, developed country partner to absorb such budget cuts.
The political/cultural challenges highlighted by interviewees were related to 
the striking differences in professional practices among the Brazilian, Japanese 
and Angolan counterparts. While JICA seemed to emphasize thorough planning 
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of activities, with a somewhat rigid schedule, Fiocruz stressed the importance 
of getting a common diagnosis of the situations with partners. Naturally, the 
challenges that arise in the alignment of expectations and practices may also 
been seen as an opportunity for mutual institutional learning. As expected, such 
related problems were reportedly less obstructive towards the end of project 
implementation.
Finally, there were significant divergences around the “Maternal-Infant Health 
Notebook”, which was designed based on Japan’s experience. Despite contrary 
recommendations from the World Health Organization, Angola recommends that 
every baby be breast fed, including those with HIV-positive mothers. According 
to the GoA, this was required to mitigate the poor nutritional situation and high 
rates of under-five mortality in Angola. Both Brazil and Japan recommend artificial 
feeding when mothers are known to be HIV-positive. According to one interviewee, 
Brazil’s Ministry of Health and ABC decided not to participate after knowing that 
the “Maternal-Infant Health Notebook” would include Angola’s breastfeeding 
recommendation. According to another interviewee, the Brazilian government did 
not participate in the development of the tracking tool due to the perception that 
it would not meet Angola’s current needs, particularly in light of mother literacy 
issues in the country. Additionally, while a similar tool is implemented in parts 
of Brazil, the instrument has yet to consolidate itself as a successful national 
experience. The government of Brazil typically only provides technical cooperation 
in areas where a particular experience is shown to be successful domestically 
over a considerate period of time. Paradoxically, the “Maternal-Infant Health 
Notebook” was pointed out by many health stakeholders not directly involved 
in the triangular cooperation project as PROFORSA’s main result, which may be 
explained by the many consultations that occurred during its formulation.
Final remarks
Economic and political dependence tend to be associated with higher 
vulnerability and lower resiliency. While tapping on their respective comparative 
advantages, as well as the country’s natural and developed resource endowments, 
governments frequently strive to improve the sustainability of their socioeconomic 
systems by mitigating dependency-related risks. Yet, dependency on different 
resources, institutions or foreign aid, also has diverse implications to formulation, 
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ownership and implementation of national development policies. In that sense, 
managing dependencies is an important aspect of the management of development, 
particularly for governments of developing countries.
Angola’s socioeconomic trajectory since the late 1990s shows GoA’s prioritization 
of the extractive and oil industries over the attraction of foreign aid. Strict political 
conditionalities attached to North-South cooperation, as well the knowledge of 
extensive natural resources in Angola, contributed to GoA’s decision. Besides that, 
extractive and oil industries have attracted traditional and emerging powers willing 
to be part of these economic sectors expansion. Even though the GoA is still very 
much dependent on natural resources and commodities’ international price, oil 
revenues allowed the Angolan government to take on its development agenda, in 
spite of negative effects in short and medium terms related to concentration of 
wealth and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, recent presence of emerging 
powers in Angola has increased GoA’s capacity to conduct development policies 
and programmes.
Using the five fundamental principles defined in the Paris Declaration (2005) 
for making aid more effective within this context26, it is possible to notice that 
Angola has high ownership of the international cooperation projects, nevertheless, 
low alignment and mutual accountability, as indicated in the table that follows:





Managing for Results N/A
Mutual Accountability Low
Source: Elaborated by the authors
The GoA clearly “owned”, for better or worse, its development agenda, even 
though ownership in Angola could be described as top-down rather than bottom-
up. This is related to the absolute and relative size of development cooperation 
in relation to the Angola’s budget and GDP, both of which cannot be dissociated 
26 It is important to notice that this can be a controversial approach, as those principles were defined under OECD’s 
umbrella and South-South Cooperation principles do not follow this effectiveness perspective. Even so, this 
approach is useful to understand how the partner’s domestic dynamic impact upon development cooperation.
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from the GoA’s choice to pursue economic development centred on the extractive 
sector since the beginning of the 2000s. This assessment shows how context and 
particular historical paths matter when SSC projects are designed and executed. 
The increasing engagement of the BRICS countries in Angola has been certainly 
impacting oil dependency in complex ways. When attention is devoted to Brazilian 
health cooperation in Angola, similarities and differences between Brazil’s South-
South and North-South cooperation seem to be largely maintained, in spite of the 
different country settings. As is the case of North-South cooperation, Brazilian 
development cooperation is much smaller in volume and number of projects in 
Angola in comparison with other CPLP countries. However, Brazil’s most recent 
and important projects are either based on Brazilian domestic experiences, or 
emphasize a “structuring” dimension. The project’s research shows that institutions 
such as Embrapa and Fiocruz also seem to be projecting their particular settings, 
sectorial systems and policy choices through their development projects in Angola. 
This move must be seen not only in light of Brazil’s government more general 
foreign policy in that period, but also as a way to strengthen their particular 
institutional positions and principles that underlie their work within international 
and domestic fields.
The fieldwork has shown that Brazilian partners in Angola resisted against 
certain Angolan practices already under implementation for several years. This 
was clear in particularly regarding Angola’s policy of mandatory breastfeeding. 
In this sense, Brazilian resistance would defy the SSC principle of autonomy and 
ownership of the GoA to decide its own path. Finally, PROFORSA does not seem to 
have enough recognition, contrary to the broadly known and debated Prosavana 
in Mozambique, to raise resistance or support from civil society, which makes it 
more difficult to deepen the analysis.
Even though Angola shares much of its development problems with other CPLP 
countries, Angola’s historical trajectory and the country’s political configuration 
this trajectory generated make the Brazilian cooperation processes to vary widely, 
challenging the proposition commonly defended when discussing SSC that the 
shared colonial past and common development problems among emerging 
countries distinguish SSC providers from traditional donors. At the end of the day, 
contrary to assumptions always taken for granted, the Angolan case is perhaps 
demonstrating that African problems must find African solutions.
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